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CONTENTSAbstract
Applying the identi￿cation strategy employed by Driscoll (2004) for the United
States, this paper provides empirical evidence for the existence of a bank lending
channel of monetary policy transmission in the euro area. In addition, and in
contrast to recent ￿ndings for the US, we ￿nd that in the euro area changes in
the supply of credit, both in terms of volumes and in terms of credit standards
applied on loans to enterprises, have signi￿cant e⁄ects on real economic activity.
This highlights the importance of the monitoring of credit developments in the
toolkit of monetary policy and underpins the reasoning behind giving monetary
and credit analysis a prominent role in the monetary policy strategy of the ECB.
It also points to the potential negative repercussions on real economic growth
of bank balance sheet impairments arising in the context of the ￿nancial crisis
erupting in mid-2007 which led to the need for banks to delever their balance
sheets and possibly to reduce their loan supply.
Keywords: bank credit, bank lending channel, euro area, panel data
JEL classi￿cation: C23, E51, E52, G21
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The ￿nancial crisis which erupted in mid-2007 implied substantial impairments to euro
area banks￿balance sheets and their access to wholesale funding. This development
raised concerns about the possible impact on banks￿ability to provide lending to
households and ￿rms. Owing to the predominant position of the banking sector in the
euro area ￿nancial system an impaired provision of credit by banks could have severe
ampli￿cations on real economic activity and in￿ ation. The monetary policy actions
taken by the ECB (and other central banks) since the ￿nancial turmoil surfaced,
inter alia in the form of substantial reductions in key policy rates and the provision
of unlimited liquidity to the banking sector, to a large extent aimed at alleviating the
negative repercussions on credit supply of the balance sheet constraints that banks
faced during this period.
The e⁄ectiveness of policy actions seeking to support a continued provision of
credit to the non-￿nancial private sector relies on an in-depth understanding of the
links between monetary policy, credit supply and economic activity. Against this
background, this paper evaluates the e⁄ects of changes in credit supply on output for
the euro area. The analysis is carried out from the perspective of the bank lending
channel, thereby addressing two related questions: ￿rst, whether a change in banks￿
￿nancing cost has an e⁄ect on loan supply and, second, whether changes in banks￿
loans have an impact on output. The answer to these questions is based on two
assumptions. The ￿rst one concerns the ￿special￿status that deposits have in the
liability structure of banks, in that deposits cannot be perfectly substituted with
other forms of funding; a particularly realistic hypothesis at the current juncture.
The second assumption regards the peculiarity of loans for ￿rms (and households),
in the sense that companies (and consumers) cannot perfectly substitute loans with
bonds or equities.
When evaluating the impact of credit growth on output there are a number of
issues that need to be addressed. One of the most pertinent issues concerns the en-
dogeneity, or reverse causality, problem, since one cannot distinguish whether loan
supply a⁄ects output or, vice versa, if the demand for (and supply of) loans is deter-
mined by future expected output. This issue is addressed by adopting a model ￿ la
Driscoll (2004). This framework exploits a key insight whereby euro area countries
are viewed as a group of small open economies under a ￿xed exchange rate regime
with nationally segmented retail banking markets. Therefore, country-speci￿c shocks
to money demand will lead to country-speci￿c variations in the supply of loans. For
instance, suppose that, for a given level of output and interest rate, there is a posi-
tive money demand shock in any one of the euro area member states. If households
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exchange rates are irrevocably ￿xed, real balances should go up in the country which
has experienced the money demand shock and slightly decrease everywhere else. If
the lending channel plays a role, the deposit growth should lead to an increase in the
supply of loans due to the additional source of ￿nancing for banks. Therefore, output
should also increase assuming the imperfect substitutability between bank loans and
other sources of ￿nancing for ￿rms and households.
In line with the above discussion, since country-speci￿c money demand shocks
are correlated with loan supply but not with output and loan demand disturbances,
they are a good instrument that can be used in the regression of output on loans and
identify unambiguously the causal relationship from loans to GDP growth. The use
of these instrumental variables has the additional advantage that the ECB cannot
smooth country-speci￿c shocks due to the common monetary policy and the ￿￿xed-
exchange rate regime￿among member states.
The estimation strategy, based on pooled regressions, involves three steps, and
all the variables employed in the regressions are constructed as deviations from their
cross-sectional mean values. First, output growth is regressed on the growth rate
of bank loans to investigate whether there is a positive and signi￿cant relationship
between these two variables (albeit, at this stage, without addressing the endogene-
ity issue). In the second step, in order to retrieve money demand shocks, for each
country a money demand function is estimated. Moreover, bank loans are regressed
on these shocks to verify whether they are good instruments for loans. Third, output
is regressed on loans instrumented with money demand shocks.
Our results provide empirical evidence for the existence of a bank lending channel
of monetary policy transmission in the euro area. In addition, and in contrast to
recent ￿ndings for the US, we ￿nd that in the euro area changes in the supply of
credit, both in terms of volumes and in terms of credit standards applied on loans
to enterprises, have signi￿cant e⁄ects on real economic activity. In other words, a
change in loan growth has a positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on GDP. This
highlights the importance of including the monitoring of credit developments in the
toolkit of monetary policy and underpins the reasoning behind giving monetary and
credit analysis a prominent role in the monetary policy strategy of the ECB. These
￿ndings furthermore point to the potential negative repercussions on real economic
growth arising from the ￿nancial crisis that erupted in mid-2007 and which resulted
in serious impairments of euro area banks￿balance sheets and the need for banks to
delever and possibly to reduce their supply of loans.
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The ￿nancial crisis which surfaced in August 2007 has highlighted the vulnerability
of ￿nancial intermediaries, and more speci￿cally of the banking system, at least along
two interrelated dimensions. On the one hand, faced with the risk of insolvency due to
the erosion of their capital base after heavy losses, banks have been in need of raising
fresh capital, whether through private investors or government aid programmes. On
the other hand, banks have experienced di¢ culties in raising funds at medium and
long-term as well as at short-term: inter alia, spreads on bank bonds increased to
unprecedented levels, while Libor-OIS spreads in the inter-bank money markets also
reached historical peaks, especially following the demise of Lehman Brothers, the US
investment bank, in September 2008. Moreover, banks￿ability to securitise their loans
and transfer credit risk o⁄ their balance sheet was seriously disrupted adding further
strains on their access to funding. The mounting woes of the banking system implied
a signi￿cant pressure on banks to contract their balance sheets and, ultimately, in a
reduction of credit. For example, according to the IMF (2009), the write-downs on
securitised assets and charge-o⁄s on banks￿loan books could result in a disorderly de-
leveraging scenario through which without further capital injections from governments
and private investors, the credit growth could shrink signi￿cantly. Indeed, in the
euro area, the ￿ ows of credit to non-￿nancial corporations and households began to
signi￿cantly abate towards the end of 2008, which apart from the typical demand-
driven reaction to a downturn in the business cycle might to some extent also derive
from problems related directly to banks￿capital positions and their access to funding.
For example, the results of the ECB bank lending survey have pointed toward a
combination of demand-side and supply-side factors contributing to the deceleration
of the growth rate of loans to households and ￿rms in the euro area.1 Moreover, since
the euro area ￿nancial system is relatively bank-centred compared, for instance, to
the United States, it is relevant to assess whether there exists a signi￿cant relation
between bank loans extended to the non-￿nancial private sector and real activity.
From a monetary policy viewpoint, the di¢ culties related to bank balance sheets
arising in the context of the ￿nancial crisis have raised concerns about the e⁄ective-
ness with which monetary policy decisions are transmitted to the real side of the
economy via its impact on banking sector conditions. Monetary policy may a⁄ect
real economic activity, and ultimately in￿ ation, via its impact on the banking sector
through a number of transmission channels.2 One transmission channel a⁄ected by
1See e.g. Hempell and Kok Słrensen (2009).
2For early contributions acknowledging the importance of banks in the monetary policy transmis-
sion mechanism, see Brunner and Meltzer (1963) and Bernanke (1983). See also ECB (2008b) for a
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rates (￿interest rate channel￿ ). It has been shown that banks tend to adjust only
sluggishly their lending rates in response to changes in monetary policy rates. The
stickiness of bank rates has been found to depend among other things on the ￿nan-
cial structure and the degree of competition within the banking sector as well as on
competition from market-based sources.3 Another transmission channel often cited
in the literature and having received increasing attention over the past two decades
is the ￿credit channel￿ . According to this view, owing to informational asymmetries
and principal-agent problems between banks and their borrowers, monetary policy
may impact on the supply of loans and eventually on economic activity and in￿ ation.
This could, for example, be the case if following a monetary policy tightening certain
banks face balance sheet constraints, such as lower liquidity or capital holdings, and
hence may choose to restrain lending, as prescribed by the ￿bank lending channel￿
(or ￿narrow credit channel￿ ).4 Monetary policy via its e⁄ect on the cash ￿ ows of
potential borrowers and on the value of their collateral may likewise in￿ uence the
creditworthiness of bank borrowers leading to a change in their external ￿nancing
premium charged by the banks. This, in turn, may induce banks to alter their supply
of loans to these borrowers (the ￿broad credit channel￿ ).5 Furthermore, bank credit
has also been shown to be related to the boom and bust of economic cycles, for exam-
ple as evidenced by the correlation between credit cycles and assets cycles. The latter
fact is related to what has recently been labelled the ￿risk-taking￿channel of mone-
tary policy. This channel builds on the notion that monetary policy may amplify the
procyclical nature of bank (and non-bank) intermediation through the impact it may
have on the pricing, management and perception of risk by ￿nancial intermediaries.6
All in all, the fact that monetary policy can a⁄ect the balance sheets of banks and
detailed description of the role of banks in the monetary policy transmission mechanim.
3See e.g. Gropp et al. (2007) and Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2008).
4See Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Peek and Rosengren (1995),
Kashyap and Stein (2000), Van den Heuvel (2002) and Kishan and Opiela (2006) for some of the
early contributions to this line of the literature. For the euro area Ehrmann et al. (2001) provided
some evidence of the existence of a bank lending channel working mainly via bank liquidity positions;
see also Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon (2003) for early euro area evidence. Moreover, Gambacorta
and Mistrulli (2004) and Altunbas et al. (2004) provide evidence of the importance of bank capital
positions in the bank lending channel. More recently, Altunbas et al. (2008) point to the impact of
securitisation, bank risk, capital and liquidity positions on monetary policy transmission.
5See Bernanke et al. (1999) for the seminal contribution on the balance sheet channel of monetary
policy transmission.
6See e.g. Rajan (2005) and Borio and Zhu (2008). For recent empirical evidence of the risk-taking
channel in a European context see JimØnez et al. (2007), Maddaloni et al. (2009), Altunbas et al.
(2009), Ioannidou et al. (2009).
8
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1150
January 2010their borrowers may amplify the impact of monetary policy on the wider economy.
Whereas, as mentioned above, several studies ￿nd evidence of the importance of
the bank lending channel in the sense that monetary policy impacts on bank credit
supply, it cannot be taken for granted that such changes in credit supply in turn have
signi￿cant e⁄ects on real economic activity. Indeed, for the US neither Driscoll (2004)
nor Ashcraft (2006) ￿nd compelling evidence for a strong causal relationship between
credit supply and real output.
However, owing to the central role bank ￿nancing plays in the euro area ￿nancial
system, in this paper we set out to examine whether, in contrast to US ￿ndings,
changes in credit supply have signi￿cant e⁄ects on real activity in the euro area.
Following Driscoll (2004), using a panel econometric methodology we approach the
issue from the perspective of the bank lending channel, thereby addressing two related
questions: ￿rst, whether a change in banks￿funding has an e⁄ect on loan supply and,
second, whether changes in banks￿loans have an impact on output. The answer to
these questions is based on two assumptions. The ￿rst one concerns the ￿special￿
status that (non-interbank) deposits have in the liability structure of banks, in that
deposits cannot be perfectly substituted with other forms of funding; a particularly
realistic hypothesis at the current juncture.7 That is, in this paper we build on
the notion of imperfect substitutatibility between deposits and other sources of bank
funding as a prerequisite for the bank lending channel to exist. Hence, to the extent
that a change in the policy rate a⁄ect the money-holding sector￿ s demand for bank
deposits, banks may not be able to perfectly adjust their funding structure and as a
result they may have to alter the composition of their assets. At the same time, our
identi￿cation does not rely on the textbook notion that the central bank explicitly
can a⁄ect the volume of bank reserves, which we would argue does not correspond
to the way monetary policy is implemented in practice.8 The second assumption
regards the peculiarity of loans for ￿rms (and households), in the sense that companies
(and consumers) cannot perfectly substitute loans with other forms of ￿nance, such
as bonds or equities. This may be particularly pertinent in the case of the euro
area where bank ￿nancing is the predominant means of ￿nancing for non-￿nancial
corporations. For example, by the end of 2007 bank loans to the private sector
7In the euro area banking sector balance sheet, deposits taken from the non-￿nancial sector con-
stitute around one-third of total liabilities and thus is the most important source of bank funding.
8Many macroeconomic textbooks describing the traditional bank lending channel adhere to the
central bank￿ s ability to directly control the quantity of bank reserves through binding reserve require-
ments, which in turn should limit the banking sector￿ s ability to issue demand deposits. However,
as for example pointed out by Diyatat (2008), this view is at odds with how monetary policy is
conducted in practice. In fact, in modern central banking there is a decoupling of the short-term
interest rate set by the central bank and the reserve balances; see also Borio and Diyatat (2009).
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ECB (2009). It should furthermore be noted that Driscoll￿ s methodology implicitly
relies on the fact that US banking markets were legally segmented across US states
during most of his sample period (i.e. 1965-1998).9 While euro area retail banking
markets were not segmented in a legal sense during our sample period (i.e. 1999-2008),
in practice euro area banking markets remain largely fragmented.10
Turning to our results, we ￿nd that monetary policy has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on
credit supply providing evidence for the existence of a bank lending channel in the
euro area. Furthermore, contrary to the US experience, we document that changes
in credit supply also exert a non-negligible impact on real economic activity in the
euro area. These ￿ndings continue to hold even when we control for the impact of
the stance of bank credit standards on lending and activity. Overall, the ￿ndings of
this paper highlight the importance of monitoring and assessing credit developments
on a regular basis when conducting monetary policy and thus provide support for the
prominent role of monetary and credit analysis in the ECB monetary policy strategy.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 derives the model
capturing the bank lending channel. Section 3 discusses the data and Section 4
describes the empirical methodology and the results. In Section 5 our ￿ndings are
discussed, while Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 A model on the banking lending channel
This section ￿rst describes the model proposed by Driscoll (2004) to derive a testable
equation linking bank loans and output. The starting point is a simple aggregate
demand Keynesian model augmented with two equations for the demand and supply
of loans.
Assume that the economy is composed of M states, i = 1;:::;M, sharing a common
monetary policy and currency. The portfolio choice of each investor is between bank
deposits and bonds. While bonds bear the same interest rate r across states, the
interest rate on bank deposits, rd, can vary from one member state to another.
Assuming that the common monetary authority, although able to change the
aggregate quantity of money (in this stylised setup), cannot target the quantity of
9Indeed, as argued by e.g. Berger and Hannan (1989) and Berger et al. (1995), despite the gradual
deregulation of the US banking sector US banks still operated mainly along local perimeters. A more
recent study by Correa and Suarez (2009), however, ￿nds evidence that US banking deregulation
(i.e. inter-State integration) have helped smooth both credit to ￿rms and the ￿rms￿production and
income ￿ ows.
10This is for instance illustrated by a low level of cross-border activity and still signi￿cant cross-
country di⁄erences in the retail bank interest rates; see e.g. ECB (2008a).
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equilibrium money demand and supply equation can be written as follows:






where mit ￿ pit denotes real money balances, yit the real income and "it the state-
speci￿c shock to money demand.
In Keynesian-type frameworks, real income is equal to expenditure, which can be
dis-aggregated into consumption, investment, net exports and government spending.
Assuming that net exports depend on the exogenous exchange rate and government
spending is given, investments and consumption will (inversely) depend on the interest
rates on bonds and loans, rt and ￿it, respectively. Note that the interest rate on loans
can vary across countries. In equilibrium, the following equation holds:
yit = ￿￿rt ￿ ￿￿it + zit; (2)
where zit denotes state-speci￿c shocks to aggregate demand.
Credit is supplied by the banking system and is a function of the interest rate on
bonds and loans (that compose the asset side of the balance sheet), as well as real
money balances, since deposits are considered an imperfect substitute in the ￿nancing
sources available for banks. The relevant equation for loans￿supply can be written
as follows:
ls
it = ￿￿rt + ￿￿it + ￿ (mit ￿ pit) + wit; (3)
where wit denotes state-speci￿c shocks to loan supply.
Similarly, the loan demand depends on real income and the interest rate on bonds,
which corporations can issue to ￿nance their activities, and inversely on interest rates
on loans. Therefore the demand for loans takes on the following functional form:
ld
it = ￿rt ￿ ￿￿it + !yit + ￿it; (4)
where ￿it denotes state-speci￿c shocks to loan demand.
Since the ultimate goal of the model is to obtain a framework which allows to
test for the lending channel, it is important to isolate the e⁄ects that money demand
shocks have on loans (an increase in deposits increases the funding sources of the
banks which can then grant more loans) and, in turn, the impact that loans have
on real income. To this end, it is crucial to distinguish between the banking lending
channel from the interest rate channel. To solve this identi￿cation problem, Driscoll
(2004) suggests to de-mean each relevant variable xit with its cross-sectional mean:
11
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i=1 xit. The system of equations (1)-(4) can then be re-written as
follows:
e mit ￿ e pit = ￿e yit + ￿e rd
it + "it; (5)
e yit = ￿￿e ￿it + zit; (6)
e ls
it = ￿e ￿it + ￿ (e mit ￿ e pit) + wit; (7)
e ld
it = ￿￿e ￿it + !e yit + ￿it: (8)
The demeaning permits to remove the liquidity preference channel together with
the possible impacts that changes in monetary policy can have via bond yields. How-
ever, the endogeneity between money demand and output is not yet eliminated, since
the former can be a⁄ected by expected future changes in output, and, at the same
time, money demand can have an impact on output via its e⁄ect on bank lending





























Equations (9) and (10) show the inter-dependence of e yit and e lit and, therefore,
between money demand shocks and output via the impact that these shocks have on
loans. However, assuming that Corr("it;￿it) = Corr("it;zit) = 0 solves the endo-
geneity between money demand shocks and real income. The assumption is plausible,
since money demand shocks can depend on factors di⁄erent from real income (and
loan demand) such as institutional frameworks and/or preferences. Furthermore,
since the country-speci￿c shocks "it are correlated with loans (see equation (10)), but
not with output, they can be used as instruments to estimate the relation between
real income and loans. Ultimately, instrumenting loans with money demand shocks
allows to test whether changes in the supply of loans depend on changes in deposits,
i.e. an important source of funding for the banking system, and, next, the impact of
loans on real output.
11Equations (9) and (10) can be obtained by solving for ￿it in equation (8), substituting this into
equations (6) and (7), and substituting equation (5) into equation (7).
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from the ECB Bank Lending Survey (BLS), which capture whether lenders are grow-
ing more or less cautious in granting loans. Thus, a tightening of credit standards
(measured as a positive value of e csit) is expected to exert a negative in￿ uence on bank
loan supply. When adding credit standards, the (de-meaned) loan supply equation (7)
reads as follows:
e ls
it = ￿e ￿it + ￿ (e mit ￿ e pit) ￿ ￿ e csit + wit; (11)
where e csit denotes the variable ￿credit standards.￿ 12 The solution of the model gen-
erates the same real income equilibrium equation as before (see 9) and a new loan





















Similarly to bank loans, credit standards are endogenous to GDP growth. Since
credit availability depends on lenders￿standards, if, for instance, credit standards
tighten, this can generate a decrease in the credit-based level of activity of companies
and households and ultimately a GDP contraction. At the same time, loan o¢ cers
change their credit standards according to their expectations on real GPD growth.
For instance, during business cycle downturns, banks are typically more cautious
in granting credit, as collateral values and ￿rms￿net worth deteriorate, and may
decide to tighten credit standards. Therefore, to identify unambiguously the impact
of changes in credit standards to GDP variations, when regressing GDP growth on
loan growth and changes in credit standards, also this latter explanatory variable has
to be instrumented. For loan growth, similarly to the original Driscoll￿ s (2004) model,
money demand shocks are the relevant instruments used in the empirical analysis. The
information variables that are employed for credit standards are those factors a⁄ecting
them but with limited or no dependence on GDP growth. For example, in the second
question of the bank lending survey (￿Over the past three months, how have the
following factors a⁄ected your bank￿ s credit standards as applied to the approval
of loans or credit lines to enterprises?￿ ) loan o¢ cers can choose among a number
of determinants: some of them explicitly take into account ￿expectations regarding
general economic activity.￿Other determinants do not.13 Therefore, one can assume
12Note that, abusing the notation, the error term we use in equation (11) is the same as the
disturbance term in equation (7).
13When answering question 2, loan o¢ cers are supposed to provide an answer for four determinants
(A, B, C, and D), each with its own subset of possible replies. The four determinants are as follows.
13
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limited dependence on output disturbances and thus use them as instruments.
3 Data
The euro area countries included in the analysis are: Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.14 Data
are observed at quarterly frequency and cover the period 1999 Q1 to 2008 Q1, i.e.
from the inception of the European Monetary Union. This avoids the results from
being biased by any structural breaks in the empirical relationships following the
introduction of the euro.
Data on nominal and real GDP (at constant prices) as well as the GDP de￿ ator are
from Eurostat. As for the money variables, we use M3 less currency, which constitute
all bank deposits and therefore should in￿ uence the ability of banks to grant loans.
For robustness checks, we also use M2 minus currency and time deposits, i.e. a
measure of money that consists of demand and saving deposits only. In this paper,
the loan data refer to outstanding loans to non-￿nancial corporations. The source for
both the money and loan data is ECB. As for the interest rates on bank deposits we
use rates on deposits to households up to one year maturity provided by the ECB￿ s
MFI interest rate statistics.15 Data on credit standards are taken from the ECB￿ s
bank lending survey. Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics.
A) Cost of funds and balance sheet constraints, with three choices: (i) costs related to your bank￿ s
capital position; (ii) your bank￿ s ability to access market ￿nancing; (iii) your bank￿ s liquidity position.
B) Pressure from competition, with three choices: (i) competition from other banks; (ii) competition
from non-banks; (iii) competition from market ￿nancing. C) Perception of risk, with three choices:
(i) expectations regarding general economic activity; (ii) industry or ￿rm-speci￿c outlook; (iii) risk on
the collateral demanded. D) Other factors, please specify. The instruments adopted in the analysis
are those under point B) relating to the e⁄ect of competition on bank credit standards, which is
motivated by the presumption that this factor is more structurally determined and at most weakly
related to the business cycle.
14For the remainder of the euro area countries (i.e. Luxembourg, Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and
Slovakia), the relevant data series were not available for the full sample period and hence these
countries were not included in the analysis. Morevoer, apart from Luxembourg the non-included
countries only entered the euro area towards the end of the sample and therefore in the earlier part
of the sample were not exposed to the single monetary policy to the same degree as the original euro
area countries.
15Prior to January 2003 (where the o¢ cial MFI interest rate series start) we use internally estimated
back series of the deposit rates.
14
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This section discusses the empirical methodology we employ and the results we obtain.
The ￿rst important step of the analysis concerns the estimation of the money
demand equation (5) for each member state. Its estimation will allow us to recover
the corresponding residuals. The results of this ￿rst-step of our analysis are reported
in Table 2.
As an aside, we also estimate two OLS panel regressions, a ￿rst of GDP growth
on total loan growth and a second of GDP growth on changes in credit standards.
At this stage regressors are not instrumented since the objective of this exercise is
to assess the existence of a signi￿cant relation between GDP and loan growth, on
the one hand, and GPD growth and changes in credit standards, on the other hand.
Results, which are reported in Table 3, panels A and B, suggest a signi￿cant and
positive contemporaneous relation between GDP changes and loan growth, as well
as a signi￿cant and negative relation between GDP growth and changes in credit
standards lagged twice. Note that the sample period for the ￿rst panel regression
starts in 1999 Q1, while the sample for the second regression begins in 2002 Q4,
since the BLS data are only available from that quarter onwards.16 Since there exists
signi￿cant relations between GDP and loan growth, as well as GDP growth and
changes in credit standards, this suggests that we can bring the analysis forward by
instrumenting our regressors.
In the second stage of our empirical analysis, we regress loan growth on money
demand shocks based on M2 and M3, respectively. Results are reported in Table 4,
panels A and B. Money demand shocks derived from M2 are statistically signi￿cant
only contemporaneously, while those derived from M3 are signi￿cant when lagged
once and twice. To illustrate, this means that if the residuals e "it 8i (as estimated
from M2) change at a rate of one percentage point above their cross-sectional average
rate, loans will grow by 0:15% above their cross sectional average (in terms of quarter-
on-quarter growth rates), re￿ ected by the coe¢ cient of the panel regression of ￿e lit
on ￿e "it being equal to 0:15. The key message suggested by these regressions is that
the level of bank deposits is important in determining the loan supply, a necessary
condition for the existence of the banking lending channel. In other words, a positive
value of " indicates a larger amount of deposits in the banking system, which allows
16The regression between GDP and credit standards only includes the ￿ve euro area countries
with the largest GDP share relative to the whole euro area GDP, i.e. France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Spain. The main reason for not including the smaller countries is that sample sizes
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banking lending channel, we next investigate the existence of a signi￿cant relation
between GDP and loans.
To this end, in the ￿nal step of our estimation strategy, we run two panel regres-
sions: ￿rst, we regress output on loans instrumented with those money demand shocks
that turn out to be statistcally signi￿cant in the second estimation stage (i.e. e "it from
M2, as well ase "it￿1 ande "it￿2 from M3); second, as a robustness check, we run a regres-
sion where output depends on loans (again instrumented with information variables)
and credit standards. These latter variables, in turn, are instrumented with those
BLS determinants which exhibit limited correlations with GDP growth. Results are
reported in Table 4, panels A and B. The coe¢ cient corresponding to the variable ￿e lit,
i..e. the log change in loan growth, is positive and statistically signi￿cant and denotes
a non-negligible e⁄ect of bank loans on GDP. To illustrate, suppose that as a conse-
quence of the event that have recently hit ￿nancial markets, there is a deleveraging
which, for a given euro zone country, brings about a say 5% decrease in credit growth
below the euro area average. For that country, this would result into a real output
growth reduction below the corresponding (simple) average equal to 5%￿0:077 = 0:4%.
While this represents the immediate impact of a credit shock, the long-run multiplier
e⁄ect should equal 5%￿ (0:077 ￿ 0:004)=(1 ￿ 0:456 ￿ 0:322) = 1:6%.17
When the exercise is extended to include changes in credit standards, Table 5
shows that credit growth still remains a signi￿cant determinant of changes in GDP
growth, although its weight decreases (the coe¢ cient attached to ￿e lit is now equal
to 0:027). Moreover, changes in credit standards (lagged twice) enter the regression
signi￿cantly and with the expected sign, indicating that their tightening has a negative
impact on real GDP growth. To illustrate assume that credit standards tighten by
30%. This implies a decline in GDP growth below the average equal to 30%￿0:002 =
0:066%. However, these results need to be interpreted with some caution. First, the
power of the test is limited since in the euro area su¢ ciently long time series on credit
standards are not available (we use data from 2003 Q2 till 2008 Q1). Second, data
on credit standards are only recently undergoing a full cycle, which may bias the
coe¢ cients of our estimates.
5 Discussion
What could be the reasons for the ￿nding of a signi￿cantly positive impact of
17These results are broadly similar in magnitude to those obtained from imposing comparable
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standards) on real economic activity in the euro area while such e⁄ects are not appar-
ent in a US context (at least according to Driscoll, 2004)? Possible explanations most
likely derive from cross-Atlantic di⁄erences in the banking and ￿nancial structures
a⁄ecting the preconditions underlying the existence of a bank lending channel (i.e.
the non-substitutability of bank deposits and the existence of bank dependent ￿rms
and households).
As regards the uniqueness and importance of customer deposits in bank funding
structures between the euro area and the US, it might be noted that in terms of
on-balance sheet items the share of customer deposits is on aggregate not markedly
di⁄erent between commercial banks in the two economic areas. However, this may
abstract from the fact that in the US a large part of ￿nancial intermediation is not
registered on the balance sheets of commercial banks. This is, for example, illustrated
by the major role played by the Government-Sponsored Agencies in the mortgage ￿-
nancing in the US. Furthermore, o⁄-balance sheet funding by US banks is generally
more widespread than in the euro area. One example is the fact that securitisation is
considerably more advanced in the US compared to the euro area. For instance, by
end-2007 the annualised sum of securitisation transactions in the euro area amounted
to only around 3% of GDP compared to 12% of GDP in the US.18 In addition, given
the sheer size and depth of US capital markets banks may typically ￿nd it easier to
substitute deposits with market-based funding sources (such as commercial papers,
certi￿cates of deposits, bonds and equity). As an illustration, by end-2007 the com-
bined amount of quoted equity and debt securities issued in the US amounted to 312%
of GDP compared to only 166% of GDP in the euro area.19 Despite these di⁄erences
Driscoll (2004) does ￿nd evidence that US banks cannot perfectly substitute deposits.
In other words, the ￿rst precondition of a bank lending channel appear to be ful￿lled
both in the US and in the euro area.
Therefore, the di⁄erence between our results for the euro area and the US-based
studies (e.g. Driscoll, 2004; Ashcraft, 2006) propably stems primarily from the greater
dependence on bank credit of the euro area private sector. Indeed, by end-2007 bank
loans to the private sector constituted 145% of GDP in the euro area. This compares
with a corresponding ratio of 63% in the US.20 Furthermore, bank dependent ￿rms
should normally be found among the small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) which
are not able to raise funds in the capital markets. Moreover, it may be noted that
whereas the number of SMEs to the total number of ￿rms is roughly equal in the
18Based on gross issuance data from Dealogic. See also ECB (2008b).
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compared to the total number of employed people the SME sector is substantially more
important in the euro area (with a percentage of 67% of the total number of employees)
compared with the US (43%). All in all, in light of such structural di⁄erences with
respect to the role of banks in the ￿nancing of enterprises, in particular, and the
private sector more broadly, it should not be surprising that the impact on real
economic activity from shocks to banks￿supply of credit are more pronounced in the
euro area than in the US. Our ￿ndings hence seem to corroborate apriori expectations
based on the cross-Atlantic di⁄erences in ￿nancial structures.22
Finally, it cannot of course be excluded that the discrepancy between our ￿ndings
and those of Driscoll (2004) to some extent also pertains to the di⁄erent sample
periods considered in the two studies. Hence, whereas Driscoll￿ s sample period is
1965-1998 our sample covers a more limited period of 1999-2008. Concerns may also
be raised as to the fact that our sample partly overlaps with the ￿nancial crisis and
as a result it could be questioned whether our results are largely driven by dynamics
triggered by the crisis. However, we do not think this is a major issue as our sample
ends in Q1 2008 and thus does not include data for the intensi￿cation of the crisis
occurring in Q3 2008 onwards.23
6 Conclusion
To conclude, using the framework derived by Driscoll (2004), this paper has pro-
vided empirical evidence for the existence of a bank lending channel of monetary
policy transmission in the euro area. In addition, and in contrast to recent ￿ndings
for the US, we ￿nd that in the euro area changes in the supply of credit, both in
terms of volumes and in terms of credit standards applied on loans to enterprises,
have signi￿cant e⁄ects on real economic activity. This highlights the importance of
including the monitoring of credit developments in the toolkit of monetary policy and
underpins the reasoning behind giving monetary and credit analysis a prominent role
21Summing to 99% in both economic areas; according to the European Commission and the US
Census Bureau. The o¢ cial de￿nition of SMEs vary between the EU and the US authorities. Here
we follow the EU de￿nition according to which SME are ￿rms with no more than 250 employees; see
European Commission Recommendation of 06 May 2003 (2003/361/EC).
22Our ￿ndings furthermore seem to corroborate well with the di⁄erent non-standard measures taken
by the Eurosystem and the Federal Reserve during the 2007-9 ￿nancial crisis. Whereas the former
mainly focused its e⁄orts at alleviating the situation of the euro area banking sector (e.g. through
massive liquidity operations and covered bond purchases), the latter complemented such measures
by also introducing outright asset purchases vis-￿-vis the non-bank private and government sectors.
23Indeed, loan growth of loans to euro area non-￿nancial corporations reached its historical high
during the ￿rst quarter of 2008.
18
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1150
January 2010in the monetary policy strategy of the ECB. These ￿ndings furthermore point to the
potential negative repercussions on real economic growth arising from the ￿nancial
crisis that erupted in mid-2007 and which resulted in serious impairments of euro
area banks￿balance sheets and the need for banks to delever and possibly to reduce
their supply of loans. Also in this light and notwithstanding the ￿ndings of this pa-
per, further research is needed to enhance the knowledge of the dynamic relationships
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January 2010A Figures and Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Sources: Eurostat and ECB. Note: Apart from the maximum and minimum values, ￿gures
reported refer to cross-country means and medians, and standard deviations of country
averages. *Credit standards (and the three contributing factors) are measured as the net
percentage of banks reporting a tightening of standards compared with the previous quarter.
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January 2010Table 2: Country-based OLS regressions of monetary aggregates on real
GDP and interest rates
This table reports country-based OLS regressions of M2 (Panel A) and of M3 (Panel B) on
real GDP and interest rates. Coe¢ cients signi￿cant at 5% con￿dence level are reported in
bold.
Panel A: OLS regressions of M2 on real GDP and interest rates
Data are observed at quarterly frequency and cover the period 1999 Q1 to 2008 Q1. Variables
are computed as deviations from the corresponding cross-sectional average, which is denoted
with "~".
Panel B: OLS regressions of M3 on real GDP and interest rates
Data are observed at quarterly frequency and cover the period 1999 Q1 to 2008 Q1. Variables
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January 2010Table 3: OLS panel regressions of output on loans and overall credit
standards
This table reports OLS panel regressions of changes in GDP on loan growth (Panel A) and
changes in overall credit standards (Panel B). Variables are computed as deviations from
the corresponding cross-sectional average, which is denoted with a tilde symbol ￿ ~￿ . ￿e yit,
￿e lit and ￿e csit denote log changes in real GDP, log changes in loans and changes in overall
credit standards, respectively. Coe¢ cients signi￿cant at 5% con￿dence level are reported in
bold.
Panel A: OLS panel regression of GDP on loans
Data are observed at quarterly frequency and cover the period 1999 Q1 to 2008 Q1. The
countries included in the analysis are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
Panel B: OLS panel regression of GDP on overall credit standards
Data are observed at quarterly frequency and cover the period 2002 Q4 to 2008 Q1. The
countries included in the analysis are: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain.
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January 2010 25Table 4: OLS panel regressions of loans on money demand shocks from
M2 and M3
This table reports OLS panel regressions of loan growth on GDP changes and money demand
shocks from M2 (Panel A) and M3 (Panel B). Variables are computed as deviations from the
corresponding cross-sectional average, which is denoted with a tilde symbol ￿ ~￿ . ￿e yit, ￿e lit
and e "it denote log changes in real GDP, log changes in loans and money demand shocks,
respectively. Data are observed at quarterly frequency and cover the period 1999 Q1 to 2008
Q1. The countries included in the analysis are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Coe¢ cients signi￿cant at 5%
con￿dence level are reported in bold.
Panel A: OLS panel regression of loans on money demand shocks (M2)
Panel B: OLS panel regression of loans on money demand shocks (M3)
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January 2010Table 4: Instrumental variable panel regressions of GDP on loan growh
and changes in credit standards
This table reports IV panel regressions of GDP growth on loan growth (Panel A) as well
as GDP growth on loan growth and changes in credit standards (Panel B). Variables are
computed as deviations from the corresponding cross-sectional average, which is denoted
with a tilde symbol ￿ ~￿ . ￿e yit, ￿e lit and e "it denote log changes in real GDP, log changes
in loans and money demand shocks, respectively. Loan growth is instrumented with money
demand shocks, ￿e "it (as estimated from M2) as well as ￿e "it￿1 and ￿e "it￿2 (as estimated
from M3). Changes in credit standards are instrumented with those BLS determinants which
exhibit limited correlation with GDP grwth. Data are observed at quarterly frequency and
cover the period 1999 Q1 to 2008 Q1 for the ￿rst panel regression and the period 2003 Q2
to 2008 Q1 for the second panel regression. In the ￿rst regression, the countries included
in the analysis are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain; in the second regression, the countries included are:
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. Coe¢ cients signi￿cant at 5% con￿dence
level are reported in bold.
Panel A: IV panel regression of GDP growth on loans growth
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Panel B: IV panel regression of GDP growth on loans growth and changes in credit standards
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